We describe an approach to reasoning agents which is based on a formal theory of actions and is actually implemented on a mobile robot working in an o ce environment. From an epistemological viewpoint, our proposal is originated by the correspondence between Dynamic Logics and Description Logics. Speci cally, we consider an epistemic extension of Description Logics to provide a new theoretical framework for the representation of dynamic systems, where the agent's reasoning is based on its knowledge about the world. In this setting, we obtain a weaker notion of logical inference, thus simplifying the reasoning task. From a practical viewpoint, we use a general purpose knowledge representation system based on Description Logics and its associated reasoning tools, in order to plan the actions of the mobile robot \Tino", starting from the knowledge about the environment and the action speci cation. In addition, we exploit the robot's capabilities in order to integrate the execution of the plan with reactive behaviors, thus enabling the agent to accomplish its tasks in the real world.
Introduction
Research on mobile robots has been developed within the eld of Arti cial Intelligence by taking the view that a robot is an autonomous agent capable of achieving a variety of goals in a dynamic real environment. Initially, the focus of this research has been on the high-level representation of actions that the robot can perform. However, it soon became clear that it is very di cult to build robots that exhibit the desired behavior in real environments, simply on the basis of such a declarative representation. Consequently, research split into two streams, that developed rather independently of each other. On the one hand, the basic functionalities of the robot, such as navigation or sensor interpretation, have been addressed; on the other hand, sophisticated logicbased representations of the agent have been developed.
Recent work (see for example 8]) has shown that a mobile robot can e ectively be provided with reactive capabilities. However, a mobile robot needs not only the ability to promptly react and adjust its behavior based on the information acquired through its sensors, but also to achieve high-level goals. Therefore, it should also be able to reason about the actions it can perform, nd plans that allow it to achieve its goals and check whether the execution of actions leads to the accomplishment of the goals. The integration of reactive and planning capabilities has thus become a focus of research in mobile robots and planning systems (see for example 41, 24, 47] ).
We believe that this renewed e ort to combine a logic-based view of the robot as an intelligent agent with its reactive functionalities is essential to devise agents that operate in a real world environment. In this paper we present a proposal for reconciling a logic-based view of the agent with the implementation of real robots. Speci cally, we provide a framework for reasoning about actions and discuss its implementation, through a knowledge-based system, on a robot with reactive capabilities. Thus, our approach falls in the research stream of logic-based approaches for reasoning about actions (see 32]), however it has been developed as a balance between theoretical and practical considerations.
Our proposal for reasoning about actions is originated by the correspondence between Description Logics and Propositional Dynamic Logics (PDLs) 44, 14] . PDLs, that have been developed for reasoning about programs, have also been considered for reasoning about actions (e.g. 40, 15] ). In this setting, a dynamic system is represented without explicitly introducing in the language terms to denote states, as, for example in the Situation Calculus. Formulae denote then properties of states, and actions denote state transitions from one state to another. The dynamic system itself is described by two kinds of axioms: \static axioms", that account for background knowledge, and \dynamic axioms", that describe how the state changes when an action is performed. As in the deductive-planning tradition, a plan can be generated by nding a constructive existence proof for a state where the desired goal is satis ed.
Description Logics (DLs) have been developed to support a rational design of knowledge representation languages and their associated reasoning services, centered around the notions of frame and hierarchical organization of knowledge, and constitute the basis of several implemented tools 48]. The key idea underlying our proposal is to exploit the features for knowledge representation and reasoning of DLs to obtain a principled implementation of reasoning about actions in a setting derived from PDLs. In particular, we rely on a DL enriched with an epistemic operator, originally introduced to formally characterize several practical features of knowledge representation systems based on DLs, not captured by a rst-order setting 17]. Through the epistemic operator one can distinguish what is true in the world from what is known by the agent, thus allowing both for a new characterization of the dynamic system and for a weaker notion of inference.
Speci cally, the work on computational aspects of reasoning in DLs (see 19 ] for a survey) shows that the typical form of dynamic axioms leads to cyclic assertions in the knowledge base and thus requires sophisticated reasoning techniques. Hence, we have reinterpreted dynamic axioms by means of the so-called procedural rules. By relying on the epistemic interpretation of these rules given in 18], we have de ned a setting which provides both an epistemic representation of dynamic axioms and a weak form of reasoning. In this way, we obtain a simpli ed reasoning task and a semantically justi ed approach to deductive planning.
We have built an implementation on top of the mobile robot Erratic 29] , equipped with wheels and sonars, which has the capability of integrating action execution and reactive behavior; we named our mobile robot \Tino " 12] . In particular, we have addressed the implementation of the theory of action and its integration within a real robot architecture. We relied on Classic 7] , a well-known, general-purpose knowledge representation system based on DLs. An interesting feature of our approach is that the reasoning tools provided by such a system can be e ectively used in the implementation of the theoretical framework. With regard to the integration of the planning component within the robot control software, we relied on the capabilities o ered by a built-in fuzzy controller 30] to combine the execution of high-level actions with reactive behaviors that are needed in a real environment. It is worth emphasizing that this kind of integration has been of critical importance for achieving an implementation that has been successfully tested in real o ce environments.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic Description Logic formalism, and its epistemic extension. In Section 3 we describe the general framework for the representation of dynamic systems, and in Section 4 we address our speci c proposal for representing and reasoning about actions. In Section 5, we describe the implementation on the mobile robot \Tino", which includes the implementation in Classic. We conclude the paper by discussing related work (Section 6) and drawing some conclusions (Section 7).
Epistemic Description Logics
The technical background of our proposal is constituted by Description Logics (DLs) enriched with an epistemic operator. We refer to 19] for a deeper introduction to DLs.
DLs have been developed to represent the domain of interest in terms of concepts (unary predicates) that characterize subsets of the objects, called individuals, in the domain, and roles (binary predicates) over such domain. Concepts are described by means of concept expressions that can be constructed through set operators plus special constructors involving roles that link the individuals belonging to a concept to those of other concepts. One can establish a hierarchy of concepts, based on set containment (called subsumption).
We focus on a well-known DL, ALC, 45] and its epistemic extension, ALCK, obtained by adding a modal operator interpreted in terms of minimal knowledge as in 17, 18, 20] . Such an extension plays a critical role in our formalization of dynamic systems.
The abstract syntax of ALC is de ned as follows: C; D ::= A j ? j > j C u D j C t D j :C j 9R.C j 8R.C where A denotes an atomic concept, C and D denote generic concepts, R denotes an atomic role.
We shall give the semantics of ALC using the so called Common Domain Assumption (CDA): every interpretation is de ned over the same, xed, countable-in nite domain of individuals . CDA is not essential for ALC. It can be easily shown that CDA does not a ect the reasoning tasks considered in non-epistemic DLs. However, CDA is required for ALCK. Non-epistemic concepts and roles are given the standard semantics of DLs, while epistemic concepts and roles are interpreted on the class of Kripke structures where worlds are ALC-interpretations, and all worlds are connected to each other, i.e. the accessibility relation among ALC-interpretations is universal, thus Kripke structures correspond to sets of ALC interpretations.
An ALCK-interpretation is de ned as a pair (I; W), where W is a set of ALCinterpretations over the domain , and I is a distinguished interpretation belonging to W (i.e. I 2 W), such that: . A model for an ALCK-knowledge base is a set of ALC-interpretations W such that for each interpretation I 2 W, every inclusion and membership assertion of is satis ed in the ALCK-interpretation (I; W).
Next, a preference semantics on universal Kripke structures is de ned, which allows one to select only those models where the knowledge is minimal. This is achieved by maximizing in each epistemic model the number of possible worlds (i.e. ALCinterpretations), which can also be explained as maximizing ignorance. 17, 18] .
Finally, we address computational aspects of reasoning in DLs. Research in DLs has shown that there is a trade-o between the set of concept forming constructs allowed in a DL and the complexity of reasoning. More speci cally, two aspects must be carefully considered: the set of constructs allowed in the expressions; The form of the inclusion assertions.
In particular, it has been shown 45] that logical implication in ALC is an EXPTIMEcomplete problem. The high complexity of logical implication in ALC is due to the general form of inclusion assertions allowed. When considering general inclusion assertions of the form C v D, reasoning becomes EXPTIME-hard even for a simple language as FL 0 , 36], subset of ALC which contains only intersection u and universal quanti cation 8. Hence, restrictions on the form of inclusion assertions are normally considered. In particular, a set of inclusion assertions is cyclic, when a chain of individuals connected through roles can be built that connects a concept with itself. Cycles are especially problematic from the computational point of view 37, 10, 11] , and typically are not allowed by implemented systems.
Logical implication of the form j = C(a) is called instance checking. Logical Implication, and in particular instance checking in the case of ALC knowledge bases with acyclic inclusion assertions is PSPACE-complete 19], and we get the same complexity characterization even if we consider an empty knowledge base. Moreover, instance checking remains PSPACE-complete, even when ALCK is used to express the query concept C and procedural rules are allowed in the knowledge base 17].
Formalization of Dynamic Systems
Dynamic systems are typically modeled in terms of state transitions caused by actions. A state represents a possible state of a airs of the system. Each state is associated with a set of properties which hold in the represented state of a airs. Actions cause state transitions, making the system evolve from the current state to the next one.
In principle the behavior of a system, i.e. all its possible evolutions, can be represented as a transition graph, where each node denotes a state and is labeled with its associated properties, and each arc denotes a state transition and is labeled with the action that causes the transition. Note, however, that complete knowledge of the behavior of the system is required to actually de ne its transition graph, while in general one has only partial knowledge of such behavior. In deductive planning this knowledge is phrased in terms of axioms of some logic (e.g. the Situation Calculus 39] or PDLs 40] ). These axioms select a subset of all possible transition graphs.
The actual behavior of the system is in fact captured by one of the selected graphs. However, since typically one does not have enough knowledge to isolate the speci c graph capturing the actual behavior, one has to focus on those properties that are true in all the selected graphs, i.e. those properties that are logically implied by the axioms.
Our general framework allows for specifying the behavior of the dynamic system by means of three kinds of axioms: \static axioms", action \precondition axioms", and \e ect axioms".
Static axioms specify properties which are true in every state and do not depend on actions. In other words, static axioms are used for representing background knowledge that is invariant with respect to the execution of actions. Precondition axioms specify circumstances under which it is possible to execute an action. We assume that the designer of the system is able to specify su cient conditions for actions to be executed. E ect axioms specify (direct) e ects of an action if executed under given circumstances, i.e. if executed in a state satisfying certain premises. Obviously, through static axioms additional e ects can be inferred from those speci ed by e ect axioms. Observe that in general we do not require the designer to specify all the e ects of an action. The last two kinds of axioms are referred to as dynamic axioms, since both are used to model dynamic aspects of the system.
In addition to these kinds of axioms, we assume that the designer speci es the knowledge on the initial state, by providing an initial state description in terms of the properties (not involving actions) that are associated with the initial state.
Actions are assumed to be deterministic, which means that in each transition graph, given a state and an action, at most a single successor state is determined. However, the properties associated with such successor state are generally di erent in di erent transition graphs. We might say that actions are deterministic but their e ects are underdetermined in general.
To illustrate the framework, we rst show how the various parts of the speci cation of a dynamic system can be expressed in the Situation Calculus 39] . The Situation Calculus is a dialect of classical logic, in which two term sorts are distinguished: situation-terms that are used to denote states 1 , and action-terms that denote actions. Predicates that denote properties associated with states have a special situation argument and are called uents.
Following the general framework above, the behavior of the dynamic system can be speci ed as follows:
Static axioms can be expressed as 8s: (s) where (s) is a formula in which s is the unique situation argument of all uents.
The axiom speci es that holds in every state.
Precondition axioms can be expressed as 8s: (s) ) Poss(r; s)
where Poss(r; s) is a special predicate that denotes whether it is possible to execute the action r in s, and (s) is a formula in which s is the unique situation argument of all uents and in which Poss does not occur. The axiom speci es that if the precondition holds in s then r can be executed in s.
E ect axioms can be expressed as 8s:Poss(r; s)^ (s) ) (do(r; s))
where do(r; s) is a situation that denotes the state resulting from executing r in s, and (s), (do(a; s)) are formulae in which s and do(r; s), respectively, are the unique situation argument of all uents and in which Poss does not occur. The axiom speci es that in the state resulting from executing r in s, provided that r is executable, holds if the premise is satis ed in s.
The initial state description can be expressed as a sentence of the form (s 0 ) where s 0 is a special situation that denotes the initial state, and (s 0 ) is a formula in which s 0 is the unique situation argument of all uents. The sentence speci es that holds in the initial state.
In DLs states are represented by individuals, i.e. elements of the domain of interpretation. Properties of states are represented by concepts. Actions, which are assumed to be deterministic, are represented as functional roles, i.e. roles interpreted as functions instead of relations. In fact, we distinguish two kinds of roles: staticroles, which represent the usual notion of role in DLs and can be used for structuring properties of states, and action-roles, which are functional roles that denote actions.
When R is an action-role, the construct 9R.> expresses that there exists an execution of the action R, i.e. R is possible in the current state. Instead, the construct 8R.C expresses that all executions of R lead to a state where C holds, i.e., since R is deterministic, if the action R is executable then it leads to a state where C holds.
The behavior of the dynamic system is speci ed in terms of (ALC) inclusion assertions as follows: Observe that a major di erence between the formalization of dynamic systems in the Situation Calculus and the one in DLs, is that in the former there is an explicit denotation of states through situation-terms, while in the latter states are implicitly described through their properties. In this respect, the DL-based formalization is analogous to a modal formalization of dynamic systems.
Indeed, the formalization in DLs is strictly related to those based on Propositional Dynamic Logics (PDLs) 40, 15] . PDLs 23] are modal logics for reasoning about computer programs that have been studied extensively (see 31] for a survey). It has been shown that there is a tight correspondence between DLs and PDLs 44, 14], which allows for considering PDLs and DLs as syntactic variants of each other. Fig. 1 shows how the constructs of PDLs can be translated into constructs of DLs and vice versa. In view of this correspondence, the DL-based formalization considered above can be seen as a variant of the one proposed in 40]. The only di erence is that in 40] precondition axioms were not considered, forcing each action R to be executable in every state.
The kind of reasoning we are interested in can be phrased in the DL-based formalization as a logical implication of the form ? j = S v D (1) which expresses that, given a speci cation of the behavior of the system ?, and an initial state described by S, it follows that the initial state also satis es the property denoted by D, possibly involving the execution of actions.
Speci cally, in deductive planning one is interested in answering the following question: \Is there a sequence of actions that, starting from an initial state, leads to a state where a given property (the goal) holds?". Under the assumption of deterministic actions, this is captured by the following logical implication:
where PLAN FOR G stands for any concept of the form 9R 1 .9R 2 .: : : 9R n .G (with n 0 and R i any action), and expresses the existence of a nite sequence of actions leading to a state where the goal G is satis ed. Formally, PLAN FOR G can be de ned inductively as the concept P S such that: G v P S ; if C v P S , then 9R.C v P S , for every action role R. 2 From a constructive proof of the above logical implication one can extract an actual sequence of actions (a plan) that leads to the goal.
Observe that in this setting one may have very sparse knowledge about the system { say a few laws (axioms) one knows the system obeys { and yet be able to make several non-trivial inferences. Unfortunately, this generality leads to a high computational cost, as shown by the following proposition, where by propositional concept we refer to those concept expressions that are formed excluding quanti cations on roles. Initial state description constituted by a concept S which is propositional.
Deciding logical implications ? j = S v D, with D propositional, is an EXPTIME-hard problem. The proposition is an easy consequence of a complexity result in 11]: reasoning with primitive inclusion assertions, i.e. inclusion assertions of the form A v C with A an atomic concept, in the DL ALU, obtained from ALC by restricting existential quali cation to the form 9R.>, is EXPTIME-hard. In fact, the same complexity bound holds if we restrict the class of speci cations to those having precondition axioms of the form > v 9R.>, as in 40] .
Note that in the proposition above static axioms are trivially acyclic, since they are propositional. Instead, the cyclicity of dynamic axioms is unavoidable, otherwise we could not relate the truth-value of a property in state resulting from executing an action to that in the current state. For example we could not express that a property C persists over an action R, i.e. C v 8R.C.
Finally, observe that the framework presented here is quite standard both in Arti cial Intelligence and in Computer Science. However, it does not deal directly with well known formalization problems studied in Arti cial Intelligence (see e.g. 42]). In particular, the quali cation problem { i.e. the problem of nding out the actual conditions that must be true to execute an action { does not arise since the designer is required to specify su cient conditions for the execution of an action. While the frame problem { i.e. the problem of specifying what remains unchanged when an action is executed { is dealt with by requiring the designer to specify explicitly what remains unchanged by using frame axioms, that is e ect axioms of the form C v 8R.C. Note that the designer is allowed to specify e ects of actions partially. Furthermore, static axioms combined with e ect axioms can be used to specify rami cations, i.e. indirect e ects.
Reasoning about actions in epistemic DLs
In the framework described in the previous section, the dynamics of the system is speci ed in terms of what is true in the world. Now, we modify it, obtaining a new framework in which the dynamics is speci ed in terms of what the robot knows of the world. The idea is that the robot achieves its conclusions based on its epistemic state and not on the actual state of the world.
As we shall see, this change of viewpoint in the representation has two important consequences:
It simpli es reasoning, and in particular it simpli es the task of deducing plans. It makes deductive planning always constructive, i.e. the reachability of a state in which the goal holds is deduced only if there exists a known sequence of actions that leads to it. Below we introduce the new representation framework and, subsequently, address reasoning.
Representation
The behavior of the agent is again described by means of both static axioms and dynamic axioms, divided into precondition axioms and e ect axioms. Static axioms are inclusion assertions not involving action-roles, as before, and not involving cycles, in order to avoid the di culties of reasoning about them. Dynamic axioms have a di erent form that makes use of the epistemic operator K (in the following C; D denote ALC concepts):
Precondition axioms have the form KC v 9KR.> (3) which is interpreted as: if a state (individual) x is an instance of C in all possible interpretations, then there exists a state y, the same in all possible interpretations, which is the (unique) KR-successor of x. E ect axioms have the following form KC v 8KR.KD (4) that can be read as: if a state (individual) x is an instance of C in all possible interpretations, then in every interpretation each KR-successor of x (in fact at most one, being actions deterministic) is a known instance of D.
A special form of e ect axioms considered above corresponds to frame axioms, i.e. axioms expressing which properties do not change when certain actions are executed. Indeed by writing KC v 8KR.KC we express the fact that the property C is not a ected by the execution of action R.
Also the initial state description is given in a di erent way. We denote by the individual name init the initial state, and give the initial state description in terms of a membership assertion on init. In other words, the initial state description has the form S(init) where S is a concept that expresses the known properties of the initial state, and init is an individual name that denotes the initial state.
The above formalization di ers from the one given in Section 3 in two major aspects. First, we have introduced a mechanism to denote states independently of the interpretation of the concepts, namely chains of any length of roles of the form KR, with R an action-role, starting from init. In fact, init denotes an individual which in every interpretation represents the initial state. Similarly, the KR 1 -successor of init is an individual x init;R1 which represents in every interpretation the KR 1 -successor of the state represented by init. The KR 2 -successor of x init;R1 is an individual x init;R1 ;R2 which represents in every interpretation the KR 2 -successor of the state represented by x init;R1 . And so on for chains of any length of roles of the form KR, starting from init. As observed, the above described mechanism is not available in non-epistemic DLs as well as in PDLs, although it is provided by the Situation Calculus through situation-terms.
Secondly, the possibility of executing an action, and the e ects that are obtained by executing that action, are given in terms of what is known about the current state.
In fact, the presence of KC, instead of C, in the left-hand side of both precondition axioms and e ect axioms, requires C to be known for the individual x representing the current state, or more precisely requires C to be true for the state denoted by the individual x in all interpretations, i.e. C is required to be valid for the individual x. As mentioned in Section 2, this use of K is tightly connected with the realization of procedural rules in epistemic DLs. Observe that, for every property C, either C is valid for an individual or not, i.e. either C is known or it is not known in the current state. Namely, the robot has complete knowledge on its epistemic state. Such epistemic state in turn expresses the partial knowledge the robot has on the actual current state.
Let us now look at the planning problem. Let ? be the set of static axioms, precondition axioms, and e ect axioms, specifying the behaviour of the dynamic system.
Given an initial state init satisfying certain properties S, a plan exists for a speci ed goal i there exists a nite sequence of actions that, from the initial state init, leads to a state satisfying the goal. This condition is expressed by a logical implication similar to (2), namely: h?; fS(init)gi j = PLAN FOR G(init) (5) where PLAN FOR G is the concept P S de ned inductively as: KG v P S ; if C v P S , then 9KR i .C v P S , for every action-role R i . In other words, PLAN FOR G stands for any concept expression of the form 9KR 1 .9KR 2 . : : : .9KR n .KG in which n 0 and each R i is an action-role, and it expresses the fact that from the initial state init there exists a sequence of successors (the same in every interpretation) that terminates in a state (the same in every interpretation) where G holds (in every interpretation).
Condition (5) We next show, through a simple example, that the use of epistemic inclusion assertions in the formalization of the dynamic system actually weakens the deductive capabilities of the robot. Let us rst focus on the non-epistemic framework. Let ? be the following speci cation of a dynamic system behavior: The answer to this planning problem is no, since neither the robot knows that R 1 is executable, nor it knows that R 2 is executable, hence it has no plan to reach D. The di erence is that in the actual state of the world either C 2 is true or :C 2 is true. However neither C 2 nor :C 2 is known to be true by the robot (neither of the two is valid), hence the robot concludes that it cannot perform any action.
In fact, there is no known sequence of actions leading to the state satisfying the goal, yet in the non-epistemic framework the answer to the planning problem is yes, whereas it is no in the epistemic framework.
The example highlights the di erences between the epistemic setting and the nonepistemic one. On the one hand, there are cases in which in the non-epistemic setting the answer to a planning problem is yes, i.e. the logical implication (2) holds, while in the epistemic setting the answer is no, i.e. the logical implication (5) does not hold. Conversely, it is easy to see that, if in the epistemic setting the logical implication (5) holds, then the logical implication (2) holds as well in the non-epistemic setting. That is, reasoning in the epistemic framework is a sound and well characterized approximation of the non-epistemic case. On the other hand, in the epistemic setting only constructive proofs are taken into consideration, in the sense that the logical implication (5) holds only if there exists a known sequence of actions leading to the state satisfying the goal. That is, if (5) holds then we are always able to extract an actual plan. As we have seen above this is not always the case in the non-epistemic setting. Hence we can conclude that the use of the epistemic operator in the formalization of actions allows for a principled weakening of the deductive capabilities of the robot.
Reasoning
Let us now turn our attention to the problem of computing the logical implication (5).
It is worth noticing that in general the ALCK-knowledge base = h?; fS(init)gi has many preferred models, which are distinguishable even up to the renaming of states. Nevertheless, due to the special form of the epistemic inclusion assertions corresponding to the dynamic axioms in , we can build the so-called rst-order extension (FOE)
of 18], which consists of the knowledge base h? S ; fS(init)gi augmented by a set of membership assertions which are consequences (up to the renaming of states) of the epistemic inclusion assertions.
The FOE of provides a unique characterization of the knowledge that is shared by all the preferred models of . In fact, by representing dynamic axioms by means of epistemic inclusion assertions of special form above, we recover the ability of representing the behavior of the system by means of a single graph, corresponding to the FOE. Such a graph is built in the following way:
Nodes correspond to individuals denoted by chains of KR of any length starting from init and are labeled by the properties that are known for the corresponding individual.
There is an edge, labeled by R, from a node x to a node y, if y is an KR-successor of x.
The FOE summarizes the common part of all transition graphs that, by our (partial) knowledge about the dynamic system, are considered possible, thus providing a description of the actual transition graph which is partial, in the sense that: (i) certain states and transitions may be missing; (ii) the properties of the states in the graph may be only partially speci ed.
Again, let ? = ? S ? P ? E be the set of static axioms, precondition axioms, and e ect axioms, specifying the behavior of the dynamic system, let S(init) be the speci cation of the initial state init, and let = h?; fS(init)gi. The FOE of , written FOE( ), is computed by the algorithm shown in Informally, the algorithm, starting from the initial state init, iteratively proceeds as follows. First, it nds an action R which can be executed in the current state, by identifying in the set ? P a precondition axiom for R whose left-hand side is logically implied by the current knowledge base. Then, it propagates the e ects of the action R, which again is based on checking whether the left-hand side of each e ect axiom for R in the set ? E is logically implied by the properties holding in the current state. In this way, the set of properties corresponding to the e ect of the execution of R in the current state is computed. A new state is then generated, unless a state with the same properties has already been created. This step is repeated until all actions executable in the current state have been considered. Then, a new current state is chosen among those previously created and the main iteration proceeds, ultimately producing a sort of non-epistemic \completion" of the knowledge base .
The FOE is unique, that is, every order of extraction of the states from the set STATES produces the same set of assertions, up to the renaming of states. Moreover, the algorithm terminates, that is, the condition STATES = ; is eventually reached, since the number of states generated is bounded to the number of di erent conjunctions of concept expressions in the set E = fDjKC v 8KR.KD 2 ? E g, i.e. We point out that, while the notion of minimization of the properties of states, realized through the propagation of e ects (i.e. only the properties which are necessarily implied are propagated), is also correctly captured by the minimal knowledge semantics of ALCK, the minimization obtained in the FOE by always generating one new successor state does not have a direct counterpart in the semantics: This is the reason why has multiple preferred models, whereas the FOE is unique.
The following property establishes that, with respect to the logical implication problem (5), the rst-order extension of represents the information which must hold in any preferred model for . This property allows one to solve the planning problem (5) by verifying whether there is an x in FOE( ) that satis es the goal G. Only-if-part. Assume there exists a state x such that FOE( ) j = G(x). Then, there is a nite sequence of actions R i1 ; : : : ; R in (the plan) that generates x. Let x 1 be the R i1 -successor of init in FOE( ), and let W be any preferred model for . Now, the properties that init is known to verify in all worlds of W are at least the properties stated in the initial situation. Consequently, the set of epistemic inclusion assertions, corresponding to the dynamic axioms whose antecedent is satis ed by init in FOE( ), implies the same set of properties on another state (say y 1 ) that is the same in each interpretation I of W. That is, y 1 satis es at least the same properties satis ed by x 1 . Now, let x 2 be the R i2 -successor of x 1 . The same kind of reasoning can be applied, thus showing that there must exist a state y 2 in W satisfying in each world at least the same properties veri ed by x 2 . By iteration we conclude that there exists a state y n such that x 2 G I ;W for all I 2 W.
As for the computational aspects of reasoning about actions in the epistemic framework based on ALCK, it turns out that, under the assumption of acyclic static axioms, the planning problem is PSPACE-complete.
Theorem 3 Let = h? S ? P ? E ; fS(init)gi, such that ? S is an acyclic set of ALC inclusion assertions. Then, the problem of establishing whether there exists a state x such that FOE( ) j = G(x) is PSPACE-complete. Proof PSPACE-hardness follows from the fact that the subsumption problem for acyclic ALC TBoxes, which is PSPACE-complete 11], can be reduced (? P ? E = ;) to the problem of establishing whether there exists a state x such that FOE( ) j = G(x).
Membership in PSPACE is due to the fact that the maximum number of states generated in FOE( ) is 2 n (where n is the number of dynamic axioms), therefore, if there exists a state x in FOE( ) such that G(x) holds, then such a state can be generated through a sequence of actions whose length is less or equal to 2 n . This property allows for the generation of all the states, one at a time, using a polynomial amount of space.
Therefore, from Proposition 1 it follows that, under the assumption of acyclic static axioms, the planning problem is easier (unless EXPTIME=PSPACE) in the epistemic setting than in the non-epistemic one. An informal explanation of this result may be given in the following way. In the epistemic framework we model static axioms as acyclic inclusion assertions, and we model the dynamic axioms, for which the acyclicity condition would be too restrictive, by using epistemic inclusion assertions of a special form. Speci cally, in a way similar to the formalization of procedural rules, the presence of epistemic concept expressions of the form KC in the left-hand side of such inclusion assertions inhibits the usage of dynamic axioms for contrapositive reasoning, and this weakening allows for lowering the computational cost of reasoning in the epistemic framework.
Notice that the algorithm for computing FOE( ) in Fig. 2 uses exponential space, because FOE( ) can be used to nd plans for any goal, not only to know whether there exists a plan. It is easy to modify the above algorithm in order to answer to the plan existence problem using polynomial space only.
The Mobile Robot \Tino"
Our approach to reasoning about actions has been implemented on the Erratic base 29]. The robot, named Tino, has been successfully tested on several real and simulated o ce environments.
Tino is based on a two-level architecture, which combines a reactive control mechanism with a planning system. The idea of multi-level architecture dates back to the robot Shakey 38] , in which the planning system was STRIPS. However, the Erratic base allows for an e ective combination of both horizontal and vertical decomposition (see 8]). In this way the system can react immediately in dynamic environments, while di erent representations of the environment are used by di erent modules.
The reactive capabilities of the robot Tino are based on a fuzzy controller 41, 30] , that provides integrated routines for sonar sensor interpretation, map building, and navigation. The control problem is decomposed into small units of control, called (low-level) behaviors, that are distinguished in reactive ones, like avoiding obstacles, and (low-level) goal-oriented ones, like following a corridor. A blending mechanism is used to integrate reactive and goal-oriented behaviors, so that the robot can follow a corridor while avoiding obstacles.
As each module has its own representation of information, the exchange of information between the two layers is a critical issue. The communication between the planning system and the reactive controller is realized by a monitor, which takes care of the integration of planning and control, by both translating high-level actions into goal-oriented behaviors, and scheduling the activation of these behaviors. Indeed, high-level actions can be seen as goals to be achieved by the controller through the activation of appropriate behaviors 2]. Moreover, the monitor checks the correct execution of the behaviors, and returns to the planner a possible plan failure.
Below we describe the basic elements of the implementation of the planning component and of the plan execution component.
Plan Generation
One of the motivations underlying our proposal for reasoning about actions is the possibility of relying on a knowledge representation system based on DLs for the implementation. In particular, we have chosen Classic 7], a well-known system based on DLs, to take advantage of an e cient and reliable reasoning system. However, the language for representing knowledge in Classic is less expressive than the DL we have considered so far. So, we use a subset of the DL language corresponding to some of the constructs available in Classic, that we write, for ease of notation, using u for AND and 8 for ALL. The concept expression 9KR.> has been implemented by de ning a procedural hook in Classic, that we call KAPPA and abbreviate with 9 K . Furthermore, we make use of the built-in instance checking mechanism to check the validity of a concept in a state, and of triggering of rules to propagate e ects of actions.
Static axioms are expressed either as inclusion assertions ( _ ) or as concept de nitions, written :
= and interpreted as necessary and su cient conditions (see for example 9]). In this way we can write A _ C A : = C to de ne the primitive concept A as a subset of C, or equivalent to C, respectively.
In both cases cycles are not allowed.
Dynamic axioms are represented as Classic rules, denoted with 7 !. Observe that they implement the epistemic sentences KC v D, hence the rule is red only on named individuals satisfying the antecedent of the rule. Rules representing action precondition axioms and e ect axioms are thus written respectively as C 7 ! 9 K R C 7 ! 8R.D Notice that the epistemic inclusion assertion KC v 8KR.KD is correctly implemented in this setting by the Classic rule C 7 ! 8R.D, since in Classic rules are only applied to individuals explicitly mentioned in the knowledge base.
When C is the same concept expression, we sometimes abbreviate C 7 ! 9 K R and C 7 ! 8R.D as C 7 ! 9 K R u 8R.D.
Finally, concept instance assertions are used to describe initial state properties. Thus C(init) states that C is valid in the initial state.
The goal to be achieved is expressed by means of a concept describing the properties that must hold in the nal state, and the plan generation procedure tries to nd a plan, that is a sequence of actions (roles), that, starting from the initial state, leads to a state in which the concept expressing the goal holds. . In fact, if x is asserted to belong to (KAPPA R) and there is no named R-successor of x, then a new named individual is created and added to the knowledge base as R-successor of x. Subsequently, the new individual can be used for ring rules.
The generation of plans can be obtained by slightly modifying the algorithm for computing the FOE. Indeed, it is su cient to compute only a portion of the FOE, by terminating the computation as soon as a state satisfying the goal is generated. Then, one can build the plan, namely a term representing a sequence of actions that connect the initial state with the state in which the goal is satis ed. The implementation relies on the following assumptions (directly derived from the FOE algorithm), that are necessary for the termination of the plan generation procedure: (i) rules involving KAPPA must be applied only when no other rule can be red; this prevents incomplete state generations, i.e. new states are generated only after the properties of existing ones have been completely derived; (ii) when a new individual z is created and all the rules able to add properties to it are red, a search for an existing individual that is equivalent to z (i.e. described by the same concepts) is done, and if such an individual (say x) is found, z = x is imposed, so that individuals are not inde nitely generated.
It is worth noting that di erent activations of the plan generation procedure may compute the same part of the FOE several times. Therefore, we have adapted the algorithm to reuse the already computed portion of the FOE, until a plan execution failure points out that the knowledge base needs to be updated. This modi cation can lead to a signi cant reduction of the computation time. Furthermore, when the construction of the entire FOE is feasible, a plan can be obtained in two steps. First, one generates the entire FOE following the algorithm in Fig. 2 ; then the plan is searched for in the FOE. In this way, the rst step can be seen as a pre-processing of the knowledge base and it allows for a faster plan generation. The complexity of the plan generation procedure above is polynomial with respect to the size of FOE( ), that is the number of new states (individuals) generated by the FOE algorithm, and so, in general, exponential with respect to to the size of .
We observe that, under the assumption that dynamic axioms are of the form C 7 ! 9 K R u 8R.D and for each action R the precondition C in dynamic axioms involving R are disjoint from each other, we can make use of the Classic construct The FOE corresponding to the above knowledge base is given in Fig. 4 . Observe that, since in this case the requirement for using FILLS is satis ed, we compute the FOE in polynomial time.
In the above example, the concept CloseToDoor1 is de ned as a specialization of Corridor1, that is when the robot is close to the rst door, it is also in the rst corridor. Now the dynamic axiom involving the ExitD1 action has just CloseToDoor1 as e ect while in the FOE (see Fig. 4 ) from state x 1 (successor state with respect to ExitD1), the actions FollowC1ToC2 and FollowC1ToD2 (whose precondition is Corridor1) are allowed. In other words, static axioms can produce many edges of the graph with a single dynamic axiom.
The ability to de ne a taxonomic representation of the environment not only provides for a more compact way of specifying the knowledge about the problem domain, but also allows one to have a more exible and easy-to-modify representation. In particular, we have taken advantage of these features both in modeling di erent environments and in implementing a module that takes as input a topological representation 
Dynamic execution of plans
The dynamic execution of plans is achieved by a monitor, that activates the behaviors associated with high-level actions, keeps track of the current state of the robot on the FOE and checks the correct execution of these behaviors replying to the planner if a plan fails. Fig. 5 shows the execution of a simple plan (FollowC1ToD2; EnterD2) to reach Room2 in the environment described in Example 5.1. Notice the interaction of goal oriented and reactive behaviors when the robot has to avoid the unknown obstacle while following the corridor. Notice the use of axioms denoting the persistence of properties through actions (e.g. OpenDoor1 is not changed by executing action FollowC1ToD1). In this way properties concerning the status of the doors are propagated through all the states in the action graph, so, when the robot reaches the state CloseToDoor1, it can deduce that CloseToOpenDoor1 is valid too, and it can enter the door.
The monitor is also responsible for plan failure management. When an action is not successfully executed, the system can use information about possible failures to update the knowledge base and generate a new plan.
For example, if the action EnterD1 fails, we can assume that the door 1 is closed, so the system has to update the current state of the robot after the failure (i.e. it returns a new current state in which OpenDoor1 is not valid), and a new planning task is performed. In Fig. 6 the execution of a plan, whose goal is to enter in any room (speci ed by the concept Room), is shown. Note that the robot fails to enter the rst door, and after a replanning task, the second one is successfully entered.
Related Work
Autonomous navigation for mobile robots has been extensively studied from many di erent perspectives. A large debate from an architectural viewpoint was carried out in the last years (deliberative planning vs. reactivity), and many di erent planning techniques and systems were proposed.
From the architectural point of view, in 8] a layered architecture for controlling mobile robots is proposed. While previous approaches were mainly concerned with automatic plan generation and relied on complete and correct knowledge about the world, the focus of the layered architecture was in the ability to quickly react to unexpected situations. Many reactive systems for controlling mobile robots have been proposed 1, 22, 27, 46] , in which the task of plan generation is either not addressed or considered as the task of specifying reactions for each possible situation.
The integration of deliberative planning and reactive capabilities has been usually addressed by de ning di erent levels for planning and control. In many cases 26, 47, 41] world model and plan representation are shared for coordinating the subsystems. Instead, in 24] a heterogeneous and asynchronous architecture is presented in order to combine classical AI techniques with reactive control mechanisms. Our approach can be considered as heterogeneous, since it separates the planning component from the underlying control mechanisms. However, we maintain, through the monitor, a strict correspondence between the representation of the world and the plan in the two levels.
On the other hand, a signi cant application of high-level control of mobile robots can be found in Shakey the robot 38], in which the STRIPS representation system was used for planning, and in the robot programming language based on Situation Calculus 32] , where a plan is speci ed through a program. Our proposal, by relying on Description Logics, provides for an expressive formalism intermediate between propositional STRIPS and Situation Calculus. Moreover, such a formalism is actually implemented on an real mobile robot through a knowledge representation tool, which enables for the automatic generation of plans.
Several studies propose DLs for the development of planning systems (among them 16, 3, 28] ). In these proposals the language of DLs is extended with speci c constructs that allow actions to be represented as concepts. The planning system can thus reason about plans, by exploiting subsumption in DLs. Our proposal takes a di erent perspective, derived from the correspondence with PDLs, where actions are represented as roles, and properties of states as concepts. In our case, plans are generated through a combination of the propagation mechanism for the procedural rules and taxonomic reasoning for checking the static properties of states.
Finally, the ability of representing and reasoning about the epistemic state of the agent is convenient to deal with conditional plans and sensing (or knowledgeproducing) actions 33]. Indeed, there are several logic-based approaches to reasoning about actions which address this topic (see e.g. 34, 25, 35] ). In particular, the possibility of expressing and reasoning about the epistemic state of the agent has been studied in the framework of the Situation Calculus in 43], which shows the possibility of representing a knowledge modality by using the language of the Situation Calculus. In principle this allows for representing e ect axioms in terms of procedural rules in a way analogous to what we have shown in Section 4. However, the issue of implementation and the computational aspects of the corresponding planning task have not yet been addressed.
Conclusions
The goal of our work was to devise a principled realization of reasoning agents in the realm of mobile robots. In the paper we have presented a formal setting for reasoning about actions and its implementation on the Erratic base, integrating reacting behavior with action planning and execution.
We believe that the results of our work are twofold. From the standpoint of the representation of dynamic systems, the origin of our work is in the formal correspondence between Propositional Dynamic Logics and Description Logics. This has led us not only to a semantically justi ed implementation, but also to the adaptation of the formal setting in new and interesting directions. In particular, we have shown that the epistemic representation of actions simpli es the planning task and (under some restrictions) allows for the implementation of the theoretical framework for reasoning about actions in an e cient knowledge representation system (Classic).
From the standpoint of implementation, the choice of a knowledge representation system, together with the associated methodology for representing the dynamic environment and reasoning about actions, has led to a very exible implementation of the planning component, that can be easily adapted to new environments. To this end, the possibility of structuring the representation of environments using the features of a DL representation language plays a crucial role. Moreover, our implementation has been successful in a real environment because of the underlying system architecture, which provides a powerful and accessible set of functionalities. By exploiting such functionalities we obtained an e ective integration of the reasoning capabilities of the agent.
The framework developed so far is mainly concerned with the position of the robot and its moving abilities. We are currently working at several extensions of the robot capabilities, and, consequently, of the framework for reasoning about actions, that will enable Tino to address more complex scenarios.
First, it is possible in this framework to provide the robot with the ability of reasoning about its reactive abilities, in order to plan di erent kinds of reactive behaviors in di erent situations. For example, it could be useful to provide the robot with di erent kinds of obstacle avoidance behaviors: the robot could activate at the deliberative level the appropriate one, according to the kind of obstacle encountered.
Second, the notion of epistemic state of the agent can be exploited, since it can be used to address several issues arising in complex dynamic domains. In particular, we are currently focusing on the following aspects: 2. Sensing. The usage of the epistemic operator of ALCK can be exploited in our framework for reasoning about actions, in order to formalize sensing (or knowledge-producing) actions. Indeed, the possibility of representing the epistemic state of the agent allows for a simple treatment of actions whose execution only changes the knowledge of the agent without a ecting the state of the world. The rst results in this direction are reported in 13]. 3. Plan constraints. Our framework also allows in principle for addressing the problem of specifying temporally extended goals 6] and dynamic constraints on plans 5], which have been shown e ective for speeding up the planning process. 4. Multi-agents. The epistemic nature of our framework makes it feasible to address multi-agent scenarios where an agent can reason on other agents' knowledge (see 21] ). In this respect, one can take advantage of the studies on multi-modal DLs 4].
